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Abstract 
The governments of many developed economies are confronting a number of policy 
issues associated with ageing populations. For example, pension reforms, increasing 
the labour force participation of older workers and increasing the standard retirement 
age are various policy reforms suggested by the OECD to cope with the fiscal strain 
associated with ageing populations. However, many of the same governments now 
embracing these reforms had until recent times allowed the early exit of older workers 
from the labour force by various means in periods of excess labour supply, leading to 
the allegation that these governments had treated older workers as a ‘reserve army of 
labour’. In this paper panel models for the labour force participation of males aged 
55-59 and 60-64 years in 12 OECD countries are estimated as a function of social 
security and labour market variables covering the time period 1967 to 2007. In 
contrast to previous OECD modelling, allowances are made for both country specific 
intercept and slope terms in various specifications, thereby allowing the incorporation 
of unique aspects of each country’s social security system or labour market. In 
addition, both long run models and also short run models incorporating error 
correction terms are estimated. The findings suggest that the ‘one size fits all’ policy 
advocated by the OECD is inadequate to address country specific factors affecting 
older worker labour force participation. The recent pension reforms are now out of 
character with the reserve army of labour explanation and results also imply that 
governments in many OECD countries will struggle to increase older male labour 
force participation through pension policy reform alone, without addressing the 
important role of the aggregate labour market. 
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1. Introduction 
A demographic shift toward an older age profile in many developed economies 
presents their governments with a number of policy challenges. Such ageing societies 
face issues associated with changing consumption patterns, labour force participation, 
healthcare and pension usage. As such, population ageing has inspired research and 
analysis of older workers’ labour force participation and pension usage in both those 
countries affected by ageing populations as well as by international institutions. The 
primary consideration is that an increasing proportion of the older population, 
traditionally reliant upon publically funded pensions and healthcare, and a decreasing 
proportion of the population in the traditional workforce age group paying income 
tax, has been projected to place strain on future government budgets.  
 
Three international institutions that advocate alternative ageing society policies to 
address labour force participation of older workers and pension reform are the World 
Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and 
International Labour Organization (ILO). The World Bank recommends a gradual 
shift away from publicly managed pay-as-you-go schemes. Instead, a multiple pillar 
retirement income system is advocated, consisting of a mandatory publicly managed 
unfunded scheme supported by a privately managed funded scheme, and 
supplemented by voluntary savings schemes (World Bank 1994, Holzmann 1998).  
 
The OECD recommends both welfare reform and increasing labour force participation 
of older workers (OECD 1995, 1998, Blöndal and Scarpetta 1998, Casey 1998, 
Burniaux et al. 2004, Duval 2003). The OECD research contends that older worker 
labour force participation had fallen over recent decades because of generous social 
security benefit levels and eligibility criteria, encouraging older workers to exit the 
labour force prematurely. Therefore, the removal of pensions that allow early exit 
from the labour force, reduced financial incentives for early exit, and increasing the 
standard age of retirement are their proposed policies to reduce fiscal exposure and 
increase older worker labour force participation rates.  
 
In contrast, the ILO advocates a full employment strategy, anti age discrimination 
action, and flexible retirement age policies (ILO 1995, 2003, Auer and Fortuny 2000). 
Furthermore, the ILO largely rejects the rationale for the move from public to private 
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funded retirement income schemes suggested by other institutions (Gillion 1998). 
However, it is apparent that most countries have adhered to the OECD and World 
Bank strategies of trying to reduce government responsibility for pension financing, 
then attempting to increase older worker labour force participation through addressing 
social security availability and the financial incentives for early exit inherent in 
various social security schemes.  
 
Government efforts to either encourage or discourage labour force participation of 
certain groups brings us the concept of the ‘reserve army of labour’, a phrase 
attributed to Marx (Power 1983). In contrast to ‘orthodox’ economists who would 
emphasise a microeconomic focus and financial incentives associated with non-wage 
forms of income such as pensions and private saving for older worker labour force 
participation, other labour market economists contend that the State plays an active 
role in manipulating the labour force status of marginalised groups or segments of 
labour such as older workers in response to aggregate labour market conditions (for 
example, Offe and Hinrichs 1985, Laczko and Phillipson 1991 and Peck 1996). They 
contend that older workers form a segment of the labour market that can be removed 
from the labour force in periods of labour supply surplus and mobilised into the 
labour force during periods of labour supply shortages through government policy 
mechanisms. At the heart of this rationale is that reserve army of labour mobilisation 
reduces constraints to increased production and reduces wage pressures for capitalists. 
This army is then deemed expendable in periods of production decline. 
 
There are two main aspects to the research presented here. First, we present the 
background to recent policy reforms expected to affect older worker labour force 
participation. Then we look at the trends evident in labour participation of older 
workers in OECD countries and analyse various theoretical explanations for such. A 
clear divide is evident between orthodox theories that emphasis a microeconomic 
reaction to financial incentives for the work/leisure choice which are prevalent in the 
US literature versus more non-orthodox theories such as the reserve army of labour 
hypothesis which emphasise macroeconomic and institutional forces external to the 
individual which are more common in explaining older worker participation trends in 
European literature.  
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The second part of the research involves quantitative modelling of the influences of 
social security and labour market variables upon the labour force participation rates of 
older male workers (aged 55 to 64 years) for selected OECD countries. In contrast to 
previous OECD modelling, allowances are made for both country specific intercepts 
and slope terms in various model specifications. In addition, we analyse stationarity 
and cointegration issues which were also neglected in the previous OECD modelling 
of Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) and Duval (2003), allowing the estimation of both 
long run models, and short run dynamic models incorporating error correction 
mechanisms.  
 
Recent pension reforms to increase labour force participation of older workers 
primarily in response to ageing population concerns rather than labour market 
conditions do not neatly fit the reserve army of labour concept. Furthermore, model 
results show that some pension reforms suggested by the OECD would appear to be 
ineffective policy tools to stimulate older worker labour force participation in many 
countries. This implies that some OECD governments will struggle to mobilise older 
in response to ageing society policy pressures through pension reform alone without 
addressing the role of the aggregate labour market. Thus, the findings suggest that 
many countries may benefit from accepting ILO policy recommendations to stimulate 
aggregate labour demand rather than rely solely on OECD recommendations 
addressing the supply side only. 
 
The research is presented as follows: Section 2 presents the background to the 
demographic ageing of OECD populations and associated policy considerations. 
Section 3 presents the trends for older male labour force participation rates in OECD 
countries while also introducing competing explanatory theories. Section 4 presents 
the methodology employed in this study with Section 5 presenting the estimation 
results of a number of econometric models. Section 6 concludes with a summary of 
findings and policy implications. 
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2. Population Ageing and the Policy Platforms of the World Bank, OECD and 
ILO  
An ageing society is observed when there is a relative increase in older age groups’ 
population (generally aged 65 years and over) amongst the general population leading 
to an increase in average age. The populations of many developed economies are 
experiencing such a demographic phenomenon as a result of both declining fertility 
rates and increased life expectancy. For example, the average fertility rate in OECD 
countries has declined from above 3.23 children per woman aged 15-49 years in 1960 
to below 1.65 in 2006. Ceteris paribus, a fertility rate of 2.1 is required to maintain 
population stability.  Turkey and Mexico are the only two OECD countries to have 
fertility rates above 2.1. The ageing population is exacerbated by increasing life 
expectancy, with the OECD average life expectancy increasing from 65.8 and 70.8 
years in 1960 to 76 and 81.7 years in 2006 for males and females respectively (OECD 
2009a). Apart from the declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy, ageing 
of OECD country populations is intensifying as a large proportion of the population, 
comprising the baby boomer generation (born between 1946 and 1960) gradually age, 
and reach the mandatory retirement age (generally 65 years) between 2011 and 2025. 
 
The main policy concern anticipated for the governments of countries experiencing 
ageing populations was of supporting a growing proportion of older citizens 
traditionally reliant on the public purse for social security pensions and health 
expenditures. Coexisting with this situation, of course, is a smaller proportion of the 
population in the traditional working ages of between 15 and 64 years of age. 
Therefore, while the proportion of the population traditionally ‘dependent’ on social 
expenditure spending was expected to increase, the proportion of persons ‘active’ and 
working, and thereby forming the traditional income tax base to fund such 
expenditure, was expected to shrink. At the very least, this situation was expected to 
put strain on governments’ budgets to finance its social security and health 
obligations. At the extreme, this situation was speculated to lead to intergenerational 
conflict from a younger minority financially supporting an ageing majority (Johnson 
et al. 1989). This situation became further complicated by early retirement or exit 
trends of older workers (aged 55-64 years) that emerged from the 1970’s onward.  
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A simple measure of the relative size of the older population traditionally reliant on 
social security pensions and healthcare relative to the size of the labour force aged tax 
base is the old age dependency ratio. It is calculated as the percentage of so called 
‘inactives’ aged 65 and over, to the labour force aged population (generally 15 to 64 
years). Burniaux et al. (2004) projected the average OECD dependency ratio to 
increase from 26.5% in 2000 to 41.9% in 2025. There is quite a large amount of 
variation in these old age dependency ratios between OECD countries, however, all 
are projected to increase substantially over this time period. Some countries such as 
Belgium, Finland, France, Poland and Sweden are projected to have dependency 
ratios in excess of 50% in 2025. Of note is that these projections do not take into 
account the aforementioned early exit trends of those prior to the age of 65 prevalent 
in many OECD countries. 
 
Because of population ageing, older worker labour force participation rates and social 
security pension reliance have emerged as important policy issues. As such, a number 
of international institutions have suggested, and national governments implemented, 
various social security pension reforms aimed at restricting pension eligibility and 
increasing the labour force participation rates for older workers. Three international 
institutions have contributed to policy platforms to address ageing populations, 
namely, the World Bank, the OECD, and the ILO. Each has a different political 
agenda and policy recommendations, and thus different implications for older male 
labour force participation rates and social security pension use. 
 
The World Bank’s role in pension policy reform comes from its direct role as a lender 
to countries with dysfunctional pension systems, such as those in Latin America, and 
Central and Eastern Europe. The World Bank recommends a gradual shift away from 
publicly managed pay-as-you-go schemes that are unfunded and the norm in these 
countries. Instead, a multiple pillar retirement income system is advocated, consisting 
of a mandatory publicly managed unfunded scheme supported by a privately managed 
funded scheme, and supplemented by voluntary savings schemes (World Bank 1994, 
Holzmann 1998). The World Bank has the power to influence this outcome of a 
multiple pillar retirement income system by making it a condition of a borrowing 
country’s reform proposals. However, because they are primarily lenders to 
governments in dire circumstances, their power only spreads to a relative few 
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countries. Therefore, many of the advanced OECD economies facing ageing 
population profiles will not be directly affected by the World Bank’s policy position.  
 
In contrast, the OECD policy reforms directly address more affluent or developed 
nations. Their policy reform research focuses predominantly on supply side issues and 
its evolution can be described as a three part process.  First, the identification of the 
future budget exposure posed by an ageing society, especially from publicly funded 
pensions. Second, the role of the availability and financial value of pensions available 
to those aged 55-64 for explaining the decline in older labour force participation was 
established. Finally, this research was used to justify the primary role of pension 
reform for reversing early retirement trends via restrictions to eligibility and lower 
social security pension value, thereby justifying a diminishing role for public pension 
financing.  
 
Government budget exposure to an ageing society through the provision of publicly 
funded pensions and health care to its citizens was established by the OECD via 
simulation results in Leibfritz et al. (1995). Similarly, Rosevare et al. (1996) projected 
pension and health outlays to 2030 for OECD countries under various assumptions. 
The disincentives for continued work in social security systems theme was established 
in OECD (1995). They gave emphasis to the availability and financial value of State 
provided pensions prior to standard retirement age, such as from unemployment or 
disability related pensions, as incentives to leave employment. Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(1998) provided econometric evidence of the magnitude of financial disincentives for 
labour force participation of inherent within social security pensions and the scope for 
an increase in older male labour force participation rates from the removal of such. 
More recently, Duval (2003) continued this line of research by estimating the 
financial disincentives for longer labour force participation of older workers via the 
‘implicit tax rate’ on labour force participation in social security pensions for those 
aged greater than 55. As such, pension reforms suggested by the OECD consist of 
three main avenues: i) removal of pensions that allow early retirement; ii) a move 
toward actuarial neutrality of pension systems; iii) convergence of retirement ages to 
67 years (Burniaux et al. 2004).  
 
Of note is that OECD (1995) discussed employment disadvantages of older workers 
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such as the greater likelihood of becoming separated from employment involuntarily, 
and remaining so. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that this situation was often 
addressed by government policy intervention to remove the older unemployed from 
the labour market in the face of high aggregate unemployment levels. Therefore, these 
findings seem to recognise the role of labour demand and aggregate labour market 
conditions for declining older worker labour force participation rates, however, apart 
from Casey (1998) no policy recommendations have been suggested by the OECD to 
address such.  
 
The ILO has had a longer association with older worker interests than the other 
international institutions. The ILO was instrumental in improving invalid pensions for 
older workers in the 1930’s, in promoting policies for early retirement, training and 
placement of older workers in the 1960’s, and supporting job protection for older 
workers in the 1970’s. The ILO Older Worker Policy Recommendations established 
in 1980 included older workers being placed within a strategy of full employment and 
ensuring unemployment is not shifted from one group to another; anti age 
discrimination legislation and access to employment that takes into account their 
skills, experience and qualifications; measures to enable older workers to continue in 
employment under satisfactory conditions; and a gradual transition to retirement and 
flexible age of old age pension receipt (ILO 1995, 2003, Auer and Fortuny 2000).  
 
A central part of the ILO mandate is social security systems in general, and pensions 
in particular. In this respect, the ILO recommendations are out of step with the OECD 
and World Bank, with the ILO questioning the shift from public to privately managed 
schemes, where benefits levels are not guaranteed and may be based on interest rates 
or other financial market returns (Gillion 1998). Furthermore, the emphasis on a full 
employment policy and anti-age discrimination legislation sets the ILO apart from the 
World Bank and the OECD. However, it is apparent in Table 1 that governments have 
largely adhered to OECD recommendations of pension reforms, with aggregate 
demand stimulus policies only utilised by many governments recently to combat the 
global financial crisis, not to address ageing society considerations. 
  8 
 
Table 1. Recent Pension Reform Policies in Selected OECD Countries 
Country Pension Reform 
Australia Superannuation Guarantee Scheme became mandatory in 1992. 
Removal of Mature Age Allowance. 
Restrictions to Disability Support Pension eligibility. 
Increase in standard age of retirement for women from 60 to 65. 
Proposed increase in standard age of retirement to 67 years. 
Austria Decline in accrual rate of pension and increase in number of 
contribution years to reach maximum replacement rate. 
Belgium Standard age of retirement for women increased from 60 to 65. 
Finland Reforms to old age and early retirement schemes to reduce implicit 
taxes on continued work. 
France Lower implicit taxes on continued work beyond the age of 60. 
Increase in contribution period to receive full pension.  
Germany Actuarial reduction adjustment for early retirement at 63, and actuarial 
increases for deferred retirement effective by 2004. 
Actuarial reduction to unemployment pension available at age 60. 
Increase in retirement age to 67. 
Italy Lower implicit taxes on continued work up to the age of 65. 
Japan Rise in minimum retirement age from 60 to 65 by 2025. 
Contribution rates increased. 
Switzerland Standard age of retirement for women to increase from 62 to 64. 
UK Reduction in annual accrual rate in State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme. 
US Standard retirement age to rise from 65 to 67 from 2000-2022. 
Source: Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), Burniaux et al. (2004), Duval (2003)  
 
3. Older Worker Labour Force Participation Trends and Theoretical 
Explanations 
OECD countries face different policy challenges from ageing populations associated 
with their older worker labour force participation trends, social security pension 
systems, and stage of population ageing. The average labour force participation rates 
over time for OECD, European and North American countries are displayed in Figure 
1. The two age groups 55-59 and 60-64 years are presented separately as there are 
different patterns evident as well as different pension eligibility rules for these age 
groups. As expected, the labour force participation rates for males aged 60-64 years 
are noticeably lower than those for aged 55-59. In addition, a more dramatic trend 
decline in labour force participation rates is evident for those aged 60-64 from the 
1970’s to the 1990’s compared to a more gradual decline for those aged 55-59 years. 
An increase in labour force participation is observed after the year 2000, particularly 
for those aged 60-64. Finally, labour force participation rates in Europe are noticeably 
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lower than for the OECD average, with rates in North America marginally higher. 
However, this aggregated data conceals a great deal of variation at the individual 
country level. 
 
Figure 1. Labour Force Participation Rates for Males Aged 55-59 and 60-64 
(1960 to 2008)  
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Source: OECD (2009b) 
  
Theoretical explanations for older worker labour force participation rates include roles 
for labour supply choice, labour demand, and/or State social security and labour force 
participation policies. The basic orthodox model of labour force participation derived 
from the general model of consumer demand, entailing the individual’s decision 
between work and leisure emphasises the individual’s response to relative price 
(financial) variables, which in turn are conditioned by their tastes and preferences for 
work and leisure (Hicks 1946). These propositions are generally estimated using 
micro level data. The basic static model has been extended to a dynamic framework 
with the lifecycle model of labour force participation (for example, Ghez and Becker 
1975).  
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Alternative theories argue that elements left exogenous to this labour supply choice 
model are fundamental to explaining older male labour force participation. That is, 
labour demand and the institutional framework. These include the neoclassical labour 
demand theory and segmented labour market theory, addressing the firm’s design of 
financial incentives, as well as the potential role of structural changes to industry 
employment and changes to employer labour use strategies within industries (for 
example, Lazear 1979, Standing 1986, 1997, O’Brien 2005). Other labour market 
related explanations include the discouraged worker hypothesis and the reserve army 
of labour explanations. These final explanations emphasise the state of the aggregate 
labour market, a disadvantaged or marginalised position for older workers, and/or the 
systematic manipulation of the labour force status of older workers by government 
policy makers (for example, Bowen and Finegan 1969, Standing 1978, Peck 1996). 
These latter theories suggest an extreme lack of choice for older workers’ labour force 
outcomes particularly in the face of aggregate labour supply surplus with the reserve 
army of labour explanation also emphasising the selective way labour markets can be 
manipulated by policy makers. 
  
O’Brien (2001a) showed a clear divide in the literature between prevalent theoretical 
explanations emphasised in US versus European literature. A perusal of US literature 
on older worker participation reveals the apparent unfettered operation of the lifecycle 
model of labour supply, thereby emphasising preferences and the individual or family 
unit’s response to financial influences. This literature established the role for rising 
wealth and an income effect, generous social security and (private) pensions, and poor 
health (for example, Fields and Mitchell 1984, Hausman and Wise 1985, Stock and 
Wise 1990). Further research suggested that the influence of poor health had been an 
illusion. With the ‘correct’ health variable measurement, this decision was also 
dominated by financial variables (Bazzoli 1985, Costa 1996). This paradigm also 
suggested job loss resulted in an increase in the expected retirement age (Chan and 
Stevens 1999). US empirical models have typically incorporated increasing dynamic 
and structural complexity over time, again reflecting the lifecycle model, and in part 
reflecting the availability of longitudinal data (Leonesio 1996).  
 
In a special AER issue Gruber and Wise (1998), Kapteyan and De Vos (1998), 
Blundell and Johnson (1998), and Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998) emphasised the 
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financial incentives in social security, or more specifically the financial disincentives 
for continued work, in explaining older workers’ labour force participation across 11, 
mostly European countries, with the exceptions of the US and Japan. They found that 
the accrual of benefits with continued work and the age at which benefits are available 
were the most important determinants. Findings indicated an implicit tax on continued 
employment in all countries, thereby providing a financial incentive to exit the labour 
force. Furthermore, Gruber and Wise (1998) showed that differences in this implicit 
tax rate explained the majority of the differences between the included countries’ 
older worker participation rates. Of note was that the US and Japan shared a low 
implicit tax and low unused capacity of older workers, compared to high implicit 
taxes and high unused capacity in most European countries. Finally, they pointed to 
evidence that changes in social security provision preceded changes to labour force 
participation. This implied that early retirement trend could be reversed by changes to 
social security programs that had induced these early retirement trends.  
 
However, most other literature exploring European countries’ older worker labour 
force participation emphasises a marginalised position of older workers in the labour 
market, aggregate labour supply surplus and that State policy subsequently reacted to 
this by allowing older unemployed workers to exit the labour force, as well as actively 
removing employed older workers in favour of youth employment. Standing (1986) 
and Westergaard et al. (1989) suggested that prolonged excess aggregate labour 
supply, the dismantling of the ‘last in first out’ principle and other protection offered 
to older workers within the internal labour market, and employment restructuring 
away from internal labour market practices were influential in explaining UK older 
worker labour force participation. Rather than a voluntary early retirement trend, the 
involuntary nature of the retirement decision was emphasised, and lower labour force 
participation was associated with discouraged worker explanations.  
 
Casey and Laczko (1989) questioned the mere description of trends as early 
retirement, noting the large role of involuntary job loss, instead describing observed 
trends more accurately as long term unemployment. Laczko and Phillpson (1991) 
findings also challenged the simple version of the orthodox model of work-leisure 
predictions, describing the prevalence of a labour force state as ‘early exit’, 
representing an indeterminate status between the traditional two states of employment 
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and traditional retirement age at 65. Early exit was distinguished from early 
retirement, the former being associated with unemployment, especially for the low 
skilled and low educated in contracting industries. Laczko and Phillpson thus 
characterised the older age segment of the labour force as a ‘reserve army of labour’. 
 
The concept of the reserve army of labour was proposed by Karl Marx (Power 1983). 
The existence and persistence of business cycles or crises was fundamental to Marx’s 
depiction of a capitalist economy. Furthermore, Marx argued that a reserve army of 
(surplus) labour was required for, and was the product of, capitalist production and 
accumulation. The ability to mobilise marginal labour to the labour force was 
desirable for capitalists, as it allowed expansion of production without running into 
labour supply constraints and also kept wages down. This reserve army of labour was 
then deemed expendable in periods of downturn or stagnation, until required for the 
next expansion phase. According to Marx, the State protects the interests of the 
capitalists. Therefore, the key proposition to establish is whether the government is an 
active party to the manipulation of older workers’ labour force status according to 
aggregate labour market conditions. That is, older male workers being systematically 
removed from the labour force in periods of sustained high unemployment, and 
coerced into participation in periods of tighter labour market conditions via policy 
mechanisms. Researchers have noted the role of aggregate unemployment for some 
European governments’ older worker labour supply policy, such as ‘job release 
schemes’ in France, Germany and the UK in the 1980’s. Job release schemes offered 
employers financial incentives and allowed older workers to retire on a State 
sponsored pension if replaced by a targeted group, such as a youth or long-term 
unemployed person. This was in contrast to policy measures designed to keep older 
workers active after World War 2 in the face of labour shortages (Westergaard et al. 
1989). Other policies may be more passive in nature such as the availability of social 
security specifically for older people in periods of labour supply surplus and the 
removal of such in periods of labour supply shortages. 
 
This reserve army of labour explanation has also found acceptance among third 
generation segmented labour market theorists such as Offe and Hinriches (1985), 
Rubery (1992) and Peck (1996). Older male workers may form a segment of the 
labour force that can be manipulated as a reserve army of labour by the State. The 
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design of social security pensions specifically for older recipients with eligibility 
reflecting unemployment during periods of poor labour market conditions as part of 
welfare policy would provide one such avenue. As with the discouraged worker 
explanation, a weak position in the labour market would be a precondition to the 
availability of such an avenue of labour force exit for older workers. Furthermore, it 
may be seen as socially acceptable to target older males as the reserve army if they are 
subject to employment difficulties, have the alternative role of early retirement, or 
could be seen as freeing up employment for other deserving groups such as the youth.  
 
Notably, the use of older worker early exit policies in periods of excess labour supply 
was not evident in all European countries. Stille (1999) noted that older worker labour 
force participation rates in countries allowing early exit measures tend to be 
substantially lower than prime-age participation rates, with little difference between 
older and prime-aged unemployment rates. Examples of such countries include 
Belgium, France, Italy, and The Netherlands. In contrast, other European nations not 
encouraging early exit in times of high unemployment exhibit similar labour force 
participation rates for all age groups, but substantially higher unemployment rates for 
older workers versus prime age.  
 
The reserve army of labour explanation is quite prevalent in qualitative research but 
has not been specifically tested in empirical research. Testable propositions would 
first entail a relationship between older worker labour force participation rates and 
aggregate labour market conditions or constraints, thus establishing the discouraged 
worker effect as a precondition. In addition, State policy supporting this relationship 
directly via job release schemes or more indirectly with the availability of early exit 
routes in periods of excess labour supply, whereas orthodox theory would emphasise 
the financial generosity of social security affecting older worker participation rate.  
 
In summary, a stylised characterisation of US literature would emphasise the apparent 
unfettered operation of the lifecycle model with individual choice and reaction to 
financial variables. European literature suggests a greater role for the labour market 
and government policy. These forces can also be captured in a lifecycle model of 
labour supply, however, it does suggest the predominance of uncertainty and 
constraints, the environment, or other exogenous variables, rather than the simpler 
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orthodox model of work-leisure choice. As such, the discouraged worker and reserve 
army of labour explanations are prevalent in European literature to explain older 
worker participation trends.   
  
4. Methodology 
A panel econometric model will be specified and estimated in this paper capturing 12 
OECD countries and annual data covering the period 1967 to 2007. In line with the 
above discussion of various explanations of older worker labour force participation 
over time we assume that older male labour force participation rates are a function of 
financial variables that may ‘pull’ workers from the labour force in line with orthodox 
theory, as well as aggregate labour market constraints that may ‘push’ workers out 
which are more attune to discouraged worker and reserve army of labour 
explanations. Separate models are estimated for males aged 55-59 and 60-64 years 
which take into account different age eligibility rules that may be present in early 
retirement routes as well as the different standard age for receipt of countries’ old age 
pension. The basic fixed effects models are specified as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3 4(  or )kit it it it it it i itLFPR ITAXK SSRR RETAGE UNEMP PRIMEβ β β β β= + + + + + +γ ε  (1) 
 
where k denotes the age group 55-59 years or 60-64 years, i denotes an OECD 
country (i = 1, …, 12), t represents time (1967 to 2007), LFPR denotes labour force 
participation rates of older males aged 55-59 or 60-64 years,  is the implicit 
tax (%) on 5 years continued work in the ‘early retirement’ route for each age group, 
SSRR is the social security replacement rate of unemployment benefits (%), 
ITAXK
RETAGE
is the standard retirement age for receipt of the old age pension, UNEMP denotes the 
prime aged (25 – 54 years) male unemployment rate (%), and PRIME represents the 
percentage of prime age males to the population of males aged 15 to 64 years. 
 
Two alternative variable specifications are included in the specification to capture 
financial incentives for early labour force exit in countries’ social security pension 
systems, namely, the implicit tax on continued work (ITAXK) and the replacement 
rates of unemployment benefits (SSRR). Following the work of Gruber and Wise 
(1998), Kapteyan and De Vos (1998), Blundell and Johnson (1998), Börsch-Supan 
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and Schnabel (1998), and more recently Duval (2003), the implicit taxes on continued 
work, ITAX55 and ITAX60, are calculated as the change in net pension wealth from 
working an additional 5 years at ages 55 and 60, respectively (expressed as a 
percentage). 1 If additional contributions outweigh additional benefits an implicit tax 
is present. In theory the effect of this variable should be ambiguous because of 
opposing income and substitution effects, however, evidence suggests that implicit 
taxes will have an inverse effect on labour force participation (Lumsdaine and 
Mitchell 1999). The implicit tax is calculated for ‘typical early retirement’ routes such 
as early retirement pensions, disability pensions, and unemployment related pensions 
that can be taken prior allowing exit from the labour force prior to receipt of the old 
age pension. OECD reform policies entail a reduction of this implicit tax. 
 
The social security replacement rate of unemployment benefits expressed as a 
percentage (SSRR) was also used as a proxy for the financial generosity of social 
security available as a non-wage source of income. Again, we would expect a 
negative coefficient if social security generosity entices workers from the labour 
force. The replacement rate is used to represent social security value relative to 
potential labour market earnings to take into account the work/non participation 
choice of older individuals. This particular measure is also expected to be a good 
proxy of social security available to older males including disability pensions and 
early retirement pensions during the period of analysis. First, replacement rates from 
unemployment benefits are significantly positively correlated to other non-
employment benefit schemes such as disability pensions, which are the predominant 
form of non-employment benefit used by those aged 55-64 years. Second, many 
unemployment benefit schemes available to older males do not entail active job 
search. In such cases recipients are expected occupy the ‘not in the labour force’ 
status in labour force surveys.  
 
This replacement rate is calculated by the OECD as the average of the gross 
unemployment benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels, three family 
situations and three durations of unemployment (Martin 1996). Therefore, this 
measure takes into account schemes with short duration such as the US and Canada 
                                                 
1 The implicit tax data was obtained directly from Duval. Greater detail of the calculation of this data is 
given in Appendix 2 from Duval (2003). 
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with a lower value. However, in 1995 over half of OECD countries allowed 
individuals to draw on unemployment related benefits from the age of 55 to the 
standard retirement age (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1998). We use ITAXK and SSRR in 
alternative specifications as we would expect a high positive correlation between the 
two variables. The replacement rate directly captures the income replacement effect 
while the implicit tax captures age eligibility and pension accrual. 
 
The standard retirement age (RETAGE) was included to account for variation in old 
age pension receipt eligibility. It is generally the age of 65 years in most countries, 
however, some countries such as Canada, France and Italy is as low as 60 in some 
years. In these latter countries we would expect a lower labour force participation rate 
for those aged 60-64. This variable has taken on increased relevance in recent years in 
light of OECD policy recommendations to increase standard retirement age to 67 
years. It was also used in the model for males aged 55-59 years on an experimental 
basis to see if it has any noticeable effect on the labour force participation of older 
workers not necessarily close to standard retirement age.   
 
Cyclical labour force discouragement is captured by the UNEMP variable, the 
unemployment rate of prime aged males. We would expect a negative coefficient if 
labour force discouragement is a significant influence. Prime aged males are used for 
this measure to avoid endogeneity, with the labour force participation rate of older 
males being jointly determined with unemployment rates. Also, past research has 
shown a significant role for hidden unemployment for older male labour force 
participation, therefore the use of older male unemployment rates (which, by 
definition, conceal hidden unemployment) would not adequately capture this effect 
(for example Beatty et al. 2000, Fothergill 2001, O’Brien 2001b). 
 
As first proposed in Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), the percentage of prime aged males 
within the working age male population (PRIMEPR) is included in this specification 
as an additional aggregate labour market constraint. This influence is similar to the 
long-run rather than cyclical labour force discouragement concept proposed by 
Standing (1978), the BLMR (1983) and Peck (1996). The hypothesis that any increase 
in the proportion of prime aged males will crowd out older workers implies a negative 
coefficient. This proposition rests on two assumptions. First, that prime aged workers 
  17 
 
are more attractive to employers than older workers, perhaps in terms of education 
and productivity. Second, employers are rationing available jobs to those most 
attractive within rigid labour market structures, with relative wages unable to adjust to 
clear the market. This variable would appear to capture the pressures within many 
European countries of employers and governments to squeeze out older workers from 
the labour force in the face of persistent high unemployment in past recent decades 
which also coincided with a proportional increase in prime aged workers from the 
baby boomer generation.  
 
The current model specification shares some similarities with the previous OECD 
fixed effects panel models and combines the relative strengths of Blöndal and 
Scarpetta (1998) and Duval (2003). However, the restriction imposed upon these 
previous models to obtain common slope coefficients across all countries would 
appear to be an over simplistic assumption given the unique features of OECD 
countries’ labour force participation, social security systems and labour market 
features, and underutilises the panel aspect of the data. Therefore, one of the 
contributions of the current research is to allow the estimation of country specific 
slope terms for TAXK and UNEMP, being the main policy variables suggested by the 
OECD and ILO, respectively. We could not include country specific slope terms for 
RETAGE because many countries have the age of 65 for all of 1967 to 2007, meaning 
we would encounter multicollinearity issues with the constant term. We augment the 
standard fixed effects models by allowing the ITAXK and UNEMP slope coefficient 
restrictions to be relaxed in two separate models, thus preserving degrees of freedom.  
 
Another issue not considered by previous OECD modelling is stationarity, unit root 
testing and cointegration. This would appear to be a major shortcoming of previous 
modelling considering the relatively long time series aspect of data used and the 
availability of tests that can readily be conducted in contemporary econometrics 
software packages. Furthermore, the inclusion of time trends in the models of Duval 
(2003) may amount to a misspecification unless variables are time stationary. 
 
The Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) test (Levin et al. 2002) and the Breitung (BR) test 
(Breitung 2000) assume a common unit root process across all cross sections. They 
consider the basic ADF specification: 
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The difference between the LLC and BR tests relates to how the α  term is estimated.  
 
In addition, there are a number of unit root tests that allow iρ  to vary across different 
countries, namely, the Im, Peraran and Shin (IPS) test (Im et al. 2003), and the Fisher-
ADF and Fisher-PP tests (Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001)). The null 
hypothesis assumes a unit root for all i, with the alternative that some cross sections 
(countries) do not have a unit root. As is standard practice in stationarity testing all 
variables are first tested in their level form. If a unit root is present the test is then 
repeated on the first differenced data. If the first differenced data is stationary then it 
is deemed integrated of order 1, I(1).  
 
It must be noted that no attempt has been made to allow for structural breaks in this 
work. Perron (1989) noted that some unit root tests results may be biased to not 
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root in the presence of structural break(s), 
however, panel unit root tests incorporating structural breaks have only been 
formulated relatively recently (Im et al. 2005, and Hadri and Rao 2008) and are yet to 
be incorporated in mainstream econometric software. 
 
Non-stationary data (such as I(1)) should not be modelled in level format as a long-
run relationship unless a linear combination of those variables is stationary. That is, 
the variables are cointegrated (Engle and Granger 1987). If variables are non-
stationary and modelled in their level form, there is a danger of spurious regression 
results. The presence of a cointegrating relationship can be tested with unit root tests 
of residuals from the long-run equation which should resemble white noise and be 
I(0).   
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If variables are cointegrated, a valid dynamic model specification is as an error 
correction model (Engle and Granger 1987). This entails estimating a short run 
relationship with variables specified in first differences and also including the lagged 
residual (error correction term) from the long run model specified in levels. The 
coefficient attached to the error correction term should be negative and thus represents 
the speed of adjustment to the long run model. That is: 
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 1(  or )kit it it it it it it i itLFPR SSRR TAXK RETAGE UNEMP PRIME ECMβ β β β β β −Δ = + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + + +γ ε  (4) 
 
where ECM is the stationary residual from the long run model. 
 
Therefore, there are a number of contributions from the proposed modelling. First, we 
relax parameter restrictions and allow both country specific intercepts (fixed effects) 
and slope terms to further incorporate unique aspects of different OECD countries’ 
social security system and labour market characteristics. We can therefore simulate 
changes to pensions suggested by the OECD or labour market suggested by the ILO 
that are specific to each country. Second, we take into account the time series aspects 
of the data that have been neglected in previous OECD modelling and address 
stationarity issues with both unit root and cointegration tests of the data. In addition, 
these tests are conducted for both the panel as a whole as well as for individual cross 
sections (countries).  Finally, we specify and estimate both the long run models and 
short run dynamic models incorporating error correction mechanisms.  
 
5. Data and empirical results 
Most data for the included 12 OECD countries covering a maximum time period of 
1967 to 2007 was collected directly from the OECD website (OECD 2009b). The data 
for labour force participation, unemployment rates and population proportions were 
able to be constructed from annual data available, however, the social security 
replacement rates were only available biennially (OECD 2009c). Therefore, the 
replacement rate data for alternate years was imputed by interpolation between 
available years. This would appear to be appropriate given that there is little short 
term volatility in this data. The implicit tax rates and standard retirement age data was 
obtained directly from Romain Duval of the OECD (Duval 2003) for 1967 to 1999, 
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2002 and 2004. Similarly, missing data for 2000, 2001 and 2003 was imputed by a 
process of interpolation of available data. This data was not extrapolated beyond 
2004, meaning that models incorporating the ITAXK variable are only estimated for 
the 1967 to 2004 period. All variables were not available for all time periods for each 
OECD country, thus the data used in the econometric models will be an unbalanced 
panel. Included countries were chosen on the basis of data availability, with only 
those countries with at least 25 years of observations of all variables chosen for 
modelling. This left us with the 12 countries of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal Spain, Sweden and the US.  
 
Descriptive statistics for each country are presented in Table 2. As expected, the 
labour force participation rates are greater for those aged 55-59 than 60-64 years in all 
countries. However, there is much greater variation in the 60-64 participation rates 
over time. The generosity of social security varies greatly between the countries and is 
generally higher in European countries compared to Australia, Canada and the US. 
However, retirement age has been constant at 65 years for many countries (with a 
standard deviation equal to zero). As mentioned previously, this feature precluded the 
use of country specific RETAGE slope terms. Prime age unemployment rates average 
less than ten percent in all countries, however, there is a relatively large amount of 
variation over time, as expected, with cyclical fluctuations. Finally, the average 
percentage of prime aged males amongst the labour force aged population is very 
similar in most countries at around 62 to 64% and has moved very slowly over time, 
as would be expected with demographic data. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the 12 OECD 
Countries (1967 to 2007*) 
 L 55FPR  60LFPR  SSRR 55ITAX 60ITAX RETAGE UNEMP  PRIME
Australia 79.602 
(6.964) 
56.281 
(12.209) 
22.000 
(4.059) 
-0.108 
(1.657) 
3.345 
(6.525) 
65.000 
(0.000) 
4.453 
(2.444) 
62.060 
(2.458) 
Canada 76.862 
(4.182) 
53.345 
(7.263) 
16.436 
(3.023) 
1.521 
(4.027) 
5.822 
(8.340) 
62.561 
(2.749) 
7.175 
(1.814) 
63.466 
(3.335) 
Finland 70.765 
(9.087) 
44.604 
(18.303) 
25.745 
(12.327) 
55.647 
(20.087) 
57.317 
(19.819) 
65.000 
(0.000) 
5.604 
(3.605) 
62.130 
(3.633) 
France 74.110 
(8.354) 
38.430 
(21.829) 
31.915 
(6.527) 
49.161 
(14.227) 
69.821 
(19.392) 
61.890 
(2.423) 
5.210 
(2.824) 
61.669 
(2.247) 
Germany 80.458 
(4.615) 
41.279 
(12.877) 
28.351 
(1.671) 
40.568 
(16.867) 
44.564 
(15.636) 
65.195 
(0.601) 
5.155 
(2.812) 
63.404 
(1.077) 
Italy 62.241 
(6.444) 
36.103 
(12.877) 
10.319 
(12.891) 
54.950 
(20.366) 
83.780 
(22.937) 
61.305 
(2.049) 
3.969 
(1.919) 
64.184 
(4.130) 
Netherlands 71.412 
(7.634) 
37.260 
(17.307) 
46.628 
(10.507) 
54.298 
(28.626) 
73.882 
(17.844) 
65.000 
(0.000) 
4.516 
(2.852) 
63.335 
(3.124) 
Norway 84.516 
(2.319) 
68.502 
(6.703) 
24.979 
(15.165) 
13.003 
(3.728) 
13.647 
(7.029) 
67.329 
(0.872) 
2.529 
(1.629) 
63.634 
(3.484) 
Portugal 75.386 
(4.103) 
58.424 
(7.637) 
19.383 
(19.392) 
33.666 
(21.374) 
50.741 
(27.013) 
65.000 
(0.000) 
3.598 
(1.451) 
59.792 
(2.307) 
Spain 79.029 
(5.648) 
53.973 
(11.633) 
27.021 
(11.302) 
58.225 
(6.486) 
66.033 
(9.017) 
65.000 
(0.000) 
8.955 
(4.387) 
62.466 
(3.192) 
Sweden 87.566 
(3.301) 
68.331 
(8.727) 
22.021 
(11.302) 
28.247 
(17.133) 
48.332 
(29.685) 
65.463 
(0.840) 
3.305 
(2.775) 
62.947 
(2.416) 
US 83.192 
(3.875) 
63.828 
(9.398) 
15.723 
(9.229) 
5.343 
(2.473) 
9.360 
(6.858) 
65.000 
(0.000) 
4.401 
(1.495) 
62.706 
(3.300) 
Source: OECD (2009b), OECD (2009c), Duval (2003), author’s calculations 
Mean with standard deviation in brackets 
* ITAXK from 1967 to 2004 
 
Unit root tests are presented in Table 3. The bulk of evidence suggests that all 
variables are I(1) for both the panel and individual country. That is, a unit root present 
in the level form of the variable with stationarity subsequently established in the first 
difference of each variable.  
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Table 3. Unit Root Tests  
 Unit Root Test 
Variables IPS ADF PP LLC BR 
55itLFPR  6.276 
[1.000] 
6.616 
[1.000] 
6.819 
[1.000] 
3.600 
[1.000] 
5.178 
[1.000] 
55itLFPRΔ  -15.366 
[0.000] 
217.631 
[0.000] 
342.256 
[0.000] 
-17.378 
[0.000] 
-12.442 
[0.000] 
60itLFPR  7.324 
[1.000] 
11.254 
[0.987] 
10.796 
[0.990] 
4.510 
[1.000] 
7.462 
[1.000] 
60itLFPRΔ  -12.264 
[0.000] 
168.799 
[0.000] 
269.577 
[0.000] 
-13.739 
[0.000] 
-8.295 
[0.000] 
itSSRR  -0.577 
[0.282] 
34.751 
[0.072] 
10.753 
[0.991] 
0.381 
[0.649] 
0.949 
[0.829] 
itSSRRΔ  -15.058 
[0.000] 
231.579 
[0.000] 
199.059 
[0.000] 
-14.439 
[0.000] 
-11.429 
[0.000] 
55itITAX  3.873 
[1.000] 
23.354 
[0.499] 
15.078 
[0.919] 
-1.027 
[0.152] 
3.193 
[0.999] 
55itITAXΔ  -5.860 
[0.000] 
85.455 
[0.000] 
302.009 
[0.000] 
-4.690 
[0.000] 
-1.579 
[0.057] 
60itITAX  3.175 
[0.999] 
20.8554 
[0.647] 
8.617 
[0.998] 
1.111 
[0.867] 
5.123 
[1.000] 
60itITAXΔ  -4.996 
[0.000] 
79.440 
[0.000] 
57.270 
[0.000] 
-5.318 
[0.000] 
-1.729 
[0.042] 
itRETAGE  0.345 
[0.000] 
5.657 
[0.686] 
1.663 
[0.990] 
-1.042 
[0.149] 
-0.393 
[0.347] 
itRETAGEΔ  -3.615 
[0.000] 
29.358 
[0.000] 
17.290 
[0.000] 
-4.442 
[0.000] 
-3.972 
[0.000] 
itPRIME  -0.768 
[0.221] 
31.843 
[0.131] 
6.397 
[1.000] 
-1.912 
[0.028] 
-0.764 
[0.222] 
itPRIMEΔ  -4.367 
[0.000] 
72.596 
[0.000] 
72.187 
[0.000] 
-3.570 
[0.000] 
-1.221 
[0.111] 
itUNEMP  -1.391 
[0.082] 
45.266 
[0.005] 
14.157 
[0.943] 
0.452 
[0.674] 
0.580 
[0.719] 
itUNEMPΔ  -8.659 
[0.000] 
116.050 
[0.000] 
78.733 
[0.000 
-7.178 
[0.000] 
-6.805 
[0.000] 
Test statistic reported with p-value in brackets 
IPS = Im, Pesaran and Shin W-Stat 
PP = Fisher PP 
ADF = Fisher ADF 
LLC = Levin, Lin and Chu 
BR = Breitung 
 
The results from the estimated models are presented in Table 4 and 5 for males aged 
55-59 and 60-64 years respectively. Models display relatively high adjusted R2 
values, stationary residuals, and generally comparable statistically significant 
coefficients across specifications for each age group, indicating quite robust results. 
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Slope coefficients generally increase with age indicating that the labour force 
participation of males aged 60-64 are more sensitive to both pension value and labour 
market conditions.  
 
Starting with the basic fixed effects models, estimation results indicate that an 
increase in social security replacement rates (SSRR) of one percentage point will 
decrease labour force participation rates by around 0.13 percentage points for males 
55-59 and 0.28 percentage points for those aged 60-64. This is quite small in 
magnitude and indicates that a decrease in replacement rates of 10 percentage points 
will increase labour force participation of males 55-59 by less than 1.5 percentage 
points and less than 3 percentage points for males 60-64 years. In comparison, a 10 
percentage point decrease in implicit tax rates (ITAXK) will increase labour force 
participation rates for males 55-59 by less than 1 percentage point and less than 1.5 
percentage points for males aged 60-64.  An increase in the standard retirement age of 
2 years, as would be the case with most countries increasing retirement age from 65 to 
67, would increase the labour force participation rate by up to 1.5 percentage point for 
those 55-59, although this coefficient was much lower and statistically insignificant in 
the model containing the implicit tax variable. As expected, it was estimated to have a 
larger impact for those aged 60-64. However, its magnitude was also small, with an 
increase in standard retirement age of 2 years increasing labour force participation by 
only 2 to 4.5 percentage points. These results suggest that OECD pension reforms 
may not have a large impact on older male labour force participation rates. 
 
The labour force discouragement variable (UNEMP) was significant in all models. A 
1 percentage point increase in the prime age unemployment rate decreases labour 
force participation rates by approximately 0.8 to 0.9 percentage points for males 55-
59 and by around 2 to 2.4 percentage points for males aged 60-64. Therefore, a labour 
market policy to reduce unemployment by 1 percentage point would have a larger 
effect than the hypothetical pension reforms above to increase older worker labour 
force participation. It would therefore appear that the ILO recommendation to 
encourage full employment, or at the very least to stimulate the labour demand, could 
be effective in increasing older worker labour force participation to address ageing 
society concerns. Note, however, this model does not take account of possible 
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inflationary effects of this proposed policy nor the natural rate of unemployment or 
NAIRU. 
 
Finally, evidence of crowding out of the labour market of older males by younger 
prime aged workers is evident. A 1 percentage point increase in the percentage of 
prime aged males amongst the working age male population decreases labour force 
participation of those 55-59 by around 0.7 to 1 percentage point and approximately 
1.1 to 1.2 percentage points for those 60-64. This suggests that there is evidence that 
the baby boomer generation may have crowded out older workers when they were 
prime aged workers in the 1970’ and 80’s when this variable was at its highest values. 
On an optimistic note, a symptom of ageing populations is that the proportion of 
prime aged males in the labour force aged male population is now on a downward 
trend, thereby relaxing this aggregate constraint that crowded out older workers in the 
past. The baby boomers may therefore not experience the same pressure to exit the 
labour market as the preceding generation of older workers. Model results suggest 
that increased labour force participation rates of older workers observed in the early to 
mid 2000’s would have predominantly been the result of strong labour markets and a 
decline in the proportion of prime aged males amongst the labour force aged 
population rather than the recently enacted pension reforms.  
 
All models allowing for country specific slope terms offer increased adjusted R2 
values compared to the basic fixed effects models, indicating an increased level of 
explanatory power after allowing for a decrease in degrees of freedom. Furthermore, 
we observe a large amount of variation in these slopes across different countries. The 
models that allow for country specific slope terms offer very interesting insights for 
pension reform policy. The financial incentives for labour force exit are generally 
stronger than the basic model in Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, and 
Portugal indicating scope in these countries for pension reforms to increase labour 
force participation. Most of these countries have relatively high implicit taxes. 
However, the implicit tax on continued work coefficient is insignificant or even 
positive for both older age groups in half the countries listed, namely, Australia, 
Canada, Italy, Norway, Spain and the US. Australia, Canada, Norway and the US 
have quite low implicit taxes but this cannot be said for Italy and Spain. Therefore, 
these findings are in contrast to Gruber and Wise (1998) that removing implicit taxes 
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will reverse older worker early retirement trends. Indeed, the current results imply that 
pension reform policies to decrease the implicit tax on continued work would be 
ineffective in increasing older labour force participation in many countries.  
 
In contrast, the role of unemployment in the labour market is a significant negative 
influence on both age groups’ labour force participation in all countries except 
Canada, Finland, Norway and Sweden. A 1 percentage point increase in prime age 
unemployment rates is estimated to decrease labour force participation in Australia, 
France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands, Portugal and Spain by over 1 percentage 
point for males 55-59 and by between 2 and 5 percentage points for those aged 60-64. 
Of note is that Australia, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal had unemployment 
pensions or unemployment benefit schemes that had long duration and / or exempted 
active job search for older males from the 1970’s, thereby allowing labour force exit 
during higher unemployment times observed in the period of analysis. Furthermore, 
Australia, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands had labour market related criteria in 
their disability pensions, also generally enacted in the 1970’s and 1980’s, allowing 
another possible labour force exit in periods of higher unemployment (Blöndal and 
Scarpetta 1998). Therefore, these OECD countries would seem to neatly fit within the 
reserve army of labour hypothesis whereby older workers could easily be removed 
from the labour force largely via social security exits in times of excess labour supply. 
Furthermore, results would indicate that policies to decrease unemployment would 
complement pension reform policies in France, Germany, The Netherlands and 
Portugal where both pension and unemployment variables are significant, and perhaps 
even substitute for pension reform in other countries where the pension reform 
coefficients were insignificant. At the very least, findings from these models allowing 
country specific coefficients imply that different policy tools are required in different 
OECD countries and not a one policy fits all approach. 
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Models for Males 55-59 
Intercept 88.373
[0.000]
142.045
[0.000]
121.248
[0.000]
150.007 
[0.000] 
itSSRR  -0.133
[0.000]
   
55itITAX   -0.078
[0.000]
 -0.084 
[0.000] 
itRETAGE  0.698
[0.000]
0.064
[0.694]
0.240
[0.252]
0.041 
[0.822] 
itUNEMP  -0.793
[.000]
-0.883
[0.000]
-0.816
[0.000]
 
itPRIME  -0.777
[0.000]
-0.990
[0.000]
-0.847
[0.000]
-1.086 
[0.000] 
Country Specific Slope 
Coefficients 
  
 55itITAX itUNEMP 
 
 
Australia   0.901
[0.000]
-1.836 
[0.000] 
Canada   -0.623
[0.092]
-0.050 
[0.845] 
Finland   -0.127
[0.000]
-0.120 
[0.382] 
France   -0.223
[0.000]
-1.344 
[0.000] 
Germany   -0.060
[0.064]
-1.294 
[0.000] 
Italy   0.107
[0.000]
-3.290 
[0.000] 
Netherlands   -0.135
[0.000]
-1.097 
[0.000] 
Norway   0.347
[0.117]
0.684 
[0.032] 
Portugal   -0.212
[0.000]
-1.072 
[0.009] 
Spain   0.012
[0.899]
-1.054 
[0.000] 
Sweden   -0.043
[0.136]
-0.209 
[0.226] 
US   0.555
[0.000]
-0.872 
[0.005] 
     
No. of obs 442 406 406 406 
2R  0.848 0.856 0.890 0.896 
2R  0.843 0.851 0.882 0.889 
F statistic 158.945
[0.000]
154.626
[0.000]
117.865
[0.000]
125.629 
[0.000] 
LLC -5.522
[0.000]
-5.393
[0.000]
-6.285
[0.000]
-5.946 
[0.000] 
ADF 58.136
[0.000]
57.846
[0.000]
71.355
[0.000]
67.890 
[0.000] 
PP 61.555
[0.000]
59.392
[0.000]
73.079
[0.000]
67.721 
[0.000] 
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Models for Males 60-64 years 
Intercept 5.503
[0.799]
41.834
[0.000]
18.125
[0.515]
119.432 
[0.000] 
itSSRR  -0.284
[0.000]
   
60itITAX   -0.137
[0.000]
 -0.134 
[0.000] 
itRETAGE  2.250
[0.000]
1.331
[0.000]
2.277
[0.000]
1.043 
[0.006] 
itUNEMP  -1.968
[0.000]
-2.393
[0.000]
-2.401
[0.000]
 
itPRIME  -1.135
[0.000]
-1.203
[0.000]
-1.555
[0.000]
-1.891 
[0.000] 
Country Specific Slope  
Coefficients 
  
60itITAX itUNEMP 
 
Australia   -0.070
[0.699]
-3.017 
[0.000] 
Canada   1.006
[0.005]
0.021 
[0.974] 
Finland   -0.179
[0.002]
-1.326 
[0.000] 
France   -0.0827
[0.215]
-4.078 
[0.000] 
Germany   -0.361
[0.000]
-4.139 
[0.000] 
Italy   0.037
[0.491]
-4.841 
[0.000] 
Netherlands   -0.417
[0.000]
-2.156 
[0.000] 
Norway   0.249
[0.195]
0.061 
[0.927] 
Portugal   -0.162
[0.007]
-2.282 
[0.000] 
Spain   0.106
[0.506]
-2.062 
[0.000] 
Sweden   -0.120
[0.001]
-1.453 
[0.000] 
US   0.221
[0.152]
-2.166 
[0.000] 
     
No. of obs 455 419 419 419 
2R  0.840 0.843 0.863 0.879 
2R  0.834 0.837 0.854 0.871 
F statistic 153.234
[0.000]
144.257
[0.000]
94.809
[0.000]
109.089 
[0.000] 
LLC -6.870
[0.000]
-6.524
[0.000]
-6.891
[0.000]
-6.343 
[0.000] 
ADF 80.133
[0.000]
79.636
[0.000]
88.678
[0.000]
73.305 
[0.000] 
PP 71.028
[0.000]
64.749
[0.000]
71.630
[0.000]
67.701 
[0.000] 
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All of the above models specified in levels represent long run relationships. 
Furthermore, the stationary residuals from these models indicated quite stable and 
well specified relationships. However, also of interest to this study are the short run or 
dynamic relationships between these variables in OECD countries, which have not 
been explored until now. The residuals from the basic fixed effects models were 
saved, lagged one period, and used as error correction terms in their respective short 
run models. Thus all variables used in the following models are I(0). For simplicity, 
these models are estimated using country specific fixed effects, but not country 
specific slopes. 
 
Results for these short run models are contained in Table 6. Residuals from these 
models are once again stationary. The adjusted 2R  values are noticeably lower than 
those for the long run models, however, they are not directly comparable because of a 
different dependent variable and lower explanatory power is generally expected from 
a short run dynamic model specified in first differences.  
 
All coefficients are of the expected sign, however, the coefficients for the pension 
financial variables are not significant at the 1% level. Therefore, results indicate that 
pension reform policies to decrease the financial value of pensions will not have an 
immediate impact. Surprisingly, a change in the standard retirement age was 
estimated to have an impact in the short run. However, there is only limited scope to 
alter this variable and any policy to increase the standard age of retirement would 
typically be phased in over a relatively long period. In contrast, coefficiens attached to 
both aggregate labour market constraint variables, UNEMP and PRIME, are 
significant and larger in magnitude than financial pension coefficients. Finally, the 
error correction terms indicate that any deviation from the long run model is only 
corrected or adjusted by around 10 % in the following year, indicating a quite slow 
adjustment to the long run relationship. In summary, the largely insignificant 
influence of financial variables for pension reform, significant influence of the labour 
market constraints, and relatively slow adjustment toward the long run model gives 
added weight to the labour market focus recommended by ILO policies. 
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Table 6. Short Run Error Correction Models  
 55itLFPRΔ  60itLFPRΔ  
Intercept -0.172 
[0.021] 
-0.228 
[0.004] 
-0.522 
[0.000] 
-0.672 
[0.000] 
itSSRRΔ  -0.031 [0.258] 
 -0.076 
[0.031] 
 
55itITAXΔ   -0.0329 [0.0478] 
  
60itITAXΔ     -0.018 [0.315] 
itRETAGEΔ  0.841 [0.001] 
0.7853 
[0.003] 
1.484 
[0.000] 
1.369 
[0.000] 
itUNEMPΔ  -0.305 [0.000] 
-0.308 
[0.000] 
-0.550 
[0.000] 
-0.529 
[0.000] 
itPRIMEΔ  -0.541 [0.000] 
-0.536 
[0.000] 
-0.377 
[0.004] 
-0.355 
[0.000] 
1itECM −  -0.111 [0.000] 
-0.117 
[0.000] 
-0.101 
[0.000] 
-0.110 
[0.000] 
     
No. of obs 430 394 443 407 
2R  0.140 0.156 0.241 0.262 
2R  0.106 0.120 0.212 0.231 
F statistic 4.187 
[0.000] 
4.356 
[0.000] 
8.445 
[0.000] 
8.636 
[0.000] 
LLC -18.248 
[0.000] 
-18.006 
[0.000] 
-13.223 
[0.000] 
-13.944 
[0.000] 
ADF 325.387 
[0.000] 
309.837 
[0.000] 
240.655 
[0.000] 
236.062 
[0.000] 
PP 325.361 
[0.000] 
310.449 
[0.000] 
275.841 
[0.000] 
254.254 
[0.000] 
 
Section 6 - Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The findings from both long run and short run dynamic econometric models 
emphasise the role of labour market variables over social security disincentives for 
employment, and also country specific causal factors, for explaining older worker 
labour force participation in the long run. Policies to reduce unemployment would 
appear to have a larger influence in increasing labour force participation rather than 
restriction to pensions or decreasing financial generosity. Indeed, the implication from 
model results was that recent increases in older male labour force participation rates 
from the year 2000 was likely to be the result of declining prime age unemployment 
rates and easing of crowding out pressures rather than the result of recently enacted 
pension reforms. However, the role of the labour market is largely ignored in OECD 
policy prescriptions to address an ageing society. It would therefore appear as if the 
recent pension reforms to address ageing populations are now out of character with 
the reserve army of labour hypothesis that has operated in many countries over recent 
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decades. That is, there is apparent asymmetry in the role of the government within this 
hypothesis. There is ample evidence of governments in many countries being party to 
the removal or exit of older males during periods of excess labour supply. Examples 
range from being indirect or passive through social security eligibility allowing exit 
via unemployment benefits design or labour market criteria in disability pensions, to 
very active with Job Release Schemes. However, pension reforms to increase older 
worker labour force participation would now seem to precede actual labour shortages 
in the future, and furthermore be predominantly based on fiscal considerations, rather 
than aggregate labour market conditions. 
 
While there appears to be an explicit recognition of the disadvantage faced by older 
workers in the labour market within the OECD research, there is an unwillingness to 
push a strong active policy stance on labour demand and employment. The lack of 
demand and employment policy reflects a lack of priority to this area and a level of 
reluctance on the part of the OECD. While a bulk of detailed OECD pension reform 
literature has been conducted backing up their pension policy reform stance, they 
meekly cite a lack of research for a lack of older worker employment policy 
formulation. This preoccupation with pension reform means that supply side policy 
affecting the relative price and availability of non-wage income is the predominant 
policy tool recommended to address an ageing society. While this may ease concerns 
over future budget exposure, it is argued that this policy stance is inequitable and 
merely shifts the financial responsibility of unemployment or retirement to the 
individual, and does little to address deficient aggregate labour demand and the labour 
market disadvantage faced by older workers. It is therefore suggested that many 
countries would stimulate older worker labour force participation by adhering to the 
ILO policy focus on a healthy labour market rather than relying solely on OECD 
pension reform policy. 
 
Finally, future research will incorporate panel unit root tests allowing for structural 
breaks, inclusion of superannuation or private saving variables, and a regime 
switching model to test for asymmetric responses to independent variables. 
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